Introduction
Recent exchange rate crises have led many to conclude that countries should either adopt°oating rates or a¯xed rate with strong institutional backing (see for example Eichengreen 1994 , Mussa et al 2000 1 . The advice stemming from the Washington institutions has tended to be towards the°oating end of the spectrum but the recent launch of the Euro has brought the other extreme (¯xed for good) to the forefront of monetary policy discussion.
2 In this corner solution debate, strong institutional backing for the¯xed end of the spectrum has been interpreted as either a currency board rule, 'dollarization' or even full monetary union.
We refer to dollarization as either the unilateral adoption of the dollar or other internationally used currency (the Euro might be a good candidate for several East European countries) or as the adoption of such a currency through the means of a Monetary Agreement which might fall short of full monetary union (we would advocate that full monetary union implies institutions to jointly determine monetary policy). The advantages of such a dramatic policy shift are normally couched in terms of the bene¯ts of the elimination of currency risk and the e®ect that that would have on interest rates and the potential for greater integration (in terms of trade and investment) with the adopted currency country (see for example Guidotti, Powell and Escud ¶ e 2000) . Greater integration, while supported by recent papers (see Frankel and Rose 2000, Rose 1999) , appears as a somewhat intangible bene¯t. In contrast, the elimination of devaluation risk appears as extremely direct. However, less clear is the link between eliminating devaluation risk and the reduction in interest rates in the adopted currency. In our view then, eliminating devaluation risk is potentially the most important bene¯t from 'dollarizing' and yet the mechanism by which that feeds through to lower interest rates, higher investment and growth remains poorly understood and largely untested. This is then the focus of this paper.
The question we address is what would happen to interest rates in the economy in the event of dollarization. There are a wide set of issues relevant here including potential gains in credibility and discipline, the e®ects of dollarization on the budget constraint of the government, the possibility of bank runs, etc. The primary purpose of this paper is to attempt to measure how all these forces impact on local interest rates.
On the one hand, it is obviously true that local currency rates will disappear together with the local currency. However, this apparent interest rate reduction may even have a negative welfare e®ect, as the economy losses instruments for nancial diversi¯cation.
3 However, the more relevant question is what would be the e®ect on interest rates at large once all debt, public and private, becomes foreign currency denominated. Because public sector spreads generally provide a lower bound for private sector¯nancing costs, the answer to this question can be obtained by estimating what would happen to country risk in the aftermath of dollarization. We believe then that measuring how dollarization a®ects country risk becomes an essential (if not the most important) issue in the dollarization debate. Therefore this paper concentrates in evaluating, empirically, if there is any relation between the elimination of the local currency risk and country risk.
The relevance of this question can easily be illustrated by a simple calculation. If the capital output ratio equals 4 and the rate of return of this capital equals 10%, the impact of a 1% reduction in the interest rate is equivalent to an increase in the value of the domestic capital stock of about 10% of GDP. As long as intertemporal consumption is related to initial wealth levels, the impact on feasible consumption may be signi¯cant, and overshadows any potential welfare loss associated to seigniorage or lender of last resort considerations. It is surprising that while these wealth e®ect seem to overshadow whatever cost dollarization may have on other dimensions, it is usually not stressed enough in the literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines brie°y the theoretical reasons why country risk could be associated to currency risk. Section 3 discuss our empirical methodology which will be based on event studies. Section 4 applies the event study methodology to European data. Here we look at events associated to the risks and/or consolidation in the process of monetary uni¯cation, and we evaluate their impact on sovereign spreads. In Section 5 we undertake a similar exercise for Latin American economies. Section 6 discusses the results.
2
The relation of currency and country risk in theory
Several issues have been identi¯ed in the literature as being relevant when assessing the impact of the elimination of the domestic currency risk on country risk. However, there is as yet no consensus as to the quantitative impact nor even the direction. Some arguments actually suggest that country risk can increase as a result of dollarization, while others suggest that it could decline. In this section we review the arguments in both directions.
Arguments for an increase in country risk
In what follows we present several arguments which could explain why there may be an increase in country risk as result of the elimination of devaluation risk. First, a country that has both local currency and foreign currency instruments outstanding may treat foreign currency instruments as senior.
4 If, however, that country fully dollarizes outstanding debt may become more homogenous in terms of seniority diluting the pre-dollarization status of foreign currency instruments. Eliminating devaluation risk through dollarization will then tend to increase the country risk premium. This relies on a set of assumptions including the view that there are states of the world where the relevant government may opt for defaulting on the domestic currency denominated debt instruments but not on those in foreign currency. Indeed, while it might be argued that foreign versus domestic debt might correlate to some extent with seniority, currency denomination is not always the right de¯nition of, for example, domestic versus foreign 5 . If foreign debt is senior with respect to domestic but domestic debt is as dollarized as foreign debt, then eliminating devaluation risk may have no impact on seniorities and hence no impact on currency risk.
Second, dollarization implies eliminating access to the in°ation tax as a way of¯nancing government spending. As a result, the intertemporal budget 4 The chapter by Neumeyer and Nicolini (2000) argue the opposite, that domestic denominated debt may have a lower default risk as it can always be in°ated away rather than defaulted on. They discuss the conditions under which this is a valid assumption.
5 Powell (2000) suggests three di®erent de¯nitions for foreign versus domestic debt depending on the question under discussion: currency of issue (if the question is related to curency mismatches), residence of purchaser (if the question is current account sustainability) or location of issue (if the question is how debt might be restructured in default scenarios).
constraint of the government, and thus its ability to pay back its foreign denominated bonds may be weakened. This may then, all things being equal, increase default risk and increase country risk.
A third channel is the weakening of the government ¶s budget constraint as a result of the loss of seigniorage revenues. Once again, the reduction in government resources increases the default risk on the government ¶s debt instruments.
A fourth channel is that in a world with imperfect substitutability of assets, investors may want to hold a diversi¯ed portfolio of domestic and foreign currency denominated bonds. Forcing the investor to shift the entire portfolio to foreign currency liabilities may induce a higher equilibrium risk premium on those instruments. This argument, however, assumes that tilting towards domestic currency instruments a portfolio of foreign currency instruments will reduce risk which is debatable in practice.
A¯nal channel we list here is that dollarization may imply greater rigidities (eg: wages and more controversially prices cannot adjust to a negative shock through changes in the exchange rate but must adjust through nominal reductions). This might produce greater output volatility, therefore inducing larger risk premia on that country's assets.
Arguments for a decrease in country risk
Similarly there are several arguments which suggest that a reduction in currency risk should induce a reduction in country risk.
The balance sheet e®ect
A¯rst argument relates to balance sheets. Suppose a country exhibits a substantial currency mismatch between assets and liabilities. For example, when liabilities are denominated largely in foreign currency and assets in domestic currency, a sharp exchange rate depreciation may lead to insolvency. Under these circumstances there is then the potential for a direct link between the risk of a change in the level of the currency (currency risk) and default risk. Table 1 exhibits a simpli¯ed computation of the balance sheet mismatch for Argentina. As can be seen the Central Government is seriously exposed to a dollar devaluation as over 90% of liabilities are in dollars. In the case of Argentina, Central Bank reserves back the monetary base due to the currency board rule so it is uncelar whether Central Bank reserves should be consolidated with the Central Government. On the other hand, on a devaluation the current level of reserves would be in excess of the value of the monetary base assuming no change in the quantities. However, even if the Central Bank's dollar assets and liabilities are consolidated with those of the Central Government there remains a signi¯cant currency mismatch in the public sector. Turning to the private sector, the table shows that the non¯nancial private sector has a positive mismatch of about $50bn and the¯nancial sector (excluding the Central Bank) also has a positive mismatch, albeit smaller (about $20bn). However, it is likely that within the private sector there are sectors that have very signi¯cant negative mismatches. In other words, it is likely that private sector dollar wealth is highly concentrated. This implies that a devaluation would not only harm sectors of the non-¯nancial private sector but this would then a®ect the¯nancial sector in the form of increased credit risk and higher non-performing loans. In summary, mismatches are such that a devaluation would provoke a very serious deterioration of the Government ¶s¯nancial position increasing the likelihood of default and also would create severe problems for areas of the private sector. It follows therefore that an increased perceived risk of devaluation may lead to higher credit spreads. 7
Other arguments
An alternative argument which explains a positive relation between country and currency risk relates to the fact that while a country maintains its own currency it may be subject to speculative attacks. The European experience during the early 90 ¶s, and that of emerging economies since 1995, are witness to the potential for these speculative attacks. These attacks may force the Central Bank to raise interest rates in order to defend the peg, inducing a domestic recession and interest rate hikes which will most likely weaken the and other decentralized agencies may also have dollar mismatches. Assets are reserves held in foreign currency and liabilities include all foreign currency denominated debt (issued domestically or abroad). For the case ofn the Central Bank, assets include international reservas plus Argentine US$ denominated Governemnt bonds held in the Central Bank. Liabilities include dollar liabilities with the domestic¯nancial system -liquidity requirements held in the Central Bank. Non-Financial Private Sector assets include external assets plus dollar denominated deposits in the¯nancial sector plus dollar denominated assets held in Argentine pension funds plus holdings of US$ cash employing an o±cial (Ministry) estimate. Liabilities include external liabilities plus dollar denominated loans in the¯nancial sector. Financial sector assets include dollar loans plus reserves held in dollars abroad (liquidity requirements held o®shore) and liabilities include dollar denominated deposits and other foreign currency liabilities.
7 Sturzenegger (2000) challenges this view by suggesting that the balance sheet of the Government is not properly measured when looking at current assets and liabilities. He claims that a present value appraoch is needed taking into account the true intertemporal assets of the government (expected future tax income) and liabilities (expected expenditure). Once this is done, one¯nds that mismatches are less severe as most government spending is on nontradables, whereas a sizable fraction of tax revenue arises from the tradable sector.
budget constraint of the government, or alternatively, increase its contingent liabilities. Eliminating the risk of currency collapses may reduce this instability which is the cause of a higher risk premium. The potential for these speculative attacks increases in a world with substantial contagion.
A third argument is that the elimination of the local currency accelerates nancial integration allowing for a reduction in interest rates through increased e±ciency of local¯nancial intermediaries. This process has been an important factor during the path leading to the launch of the euro in Europe. In a similar vein, the use of a common currency has been suggested as potentially increasing signi¯cantly the amount of trade among the geographical regions using the same currency. This increased economic e±ciency is likely to reduce risk across the board and thus reduce sovereign risk. Finally, dollarization may decrease interest rates through an increase in the credibility of policymakers, as it imposes a straightjacket for monetary and¯scal policy with high reversion costs. For a country like Ecuador, for example, this appears to have been an essential part of the motivation for pursuing dollarization.
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The Event Study methodology
Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of country risk and currency risk for Argentina and Mexico. As can easily be seen, there is a strong positive correlation between the two.
However, it is well known that such a correlation (0.82 in the case of Argentina and 0.93 in the case of Mexico) does not necessarily imply any particular causal relationship. Currency risk could cause country risk or vice versa, causality could exist in both directions or there may be no causal relationship as the correlation might be produced by a third common factor. Thus, by looking at this graph we can in no way conclude that the elimination of currency risk will entail a reduction in country risk. This is nothing but a standard identi¯cation problem. One potential route to solve this problem is through time series analyses (eg: Vector Auto-Regressions etc). Given the nature of the measures of country risk and currency risk available, however, it is in our view problematic to use conventional time series methods to test for causality. The measures available stem from market prices and hence if markets operate e±ciently both series will adjust instantaneously to news. In practice, we hypothesise that local currency asset markets are less liquid for many emerging countries than their foreign currency counterparts and this implies that country risk spreads may react more rapidly than currency risk In order to solve this identi¯cation problem, we chose to undertake an event study of the phenomena. Our methodology is to look at "events" that we can associate to changes in currency risk. We then study the evolution of sovereign risk in response to these currency events. The use of the event study ensures, on the one hand, that the currency shock is exogenous, thus allowing to solve the endogeneity problem present. On the other hand, it allows to keep all other variables constant, providing a natural experiment for the analysis and allowing to isolate the impact of currency shocks on country risk.
Following Campbell, Lo and MacKinley (1997) once the events are identi¯ed, we have to establish an estimation, event and post event window which will allow for the estimation. As with any event study the excercise consists of computing a model for the returns using the data of the estimation window and checking if there are signi¯cant deviations from this model in the post-event window. In this paper the object of study is the sovereign spread, and we test whether they change in a statistically signi¯cant way after a currency shock. We present below two models for the estimation of the normal returns: the constant mean model and the market model.
The constant mean model
In the constant mean model we assume that the expected return is a constant value, thus an abnormal return in the post-event window will correspond to deviations from the average prior to the event. The event window is chosen as the date in which the event occurs together with the three previous dates.
9 The estimation window comprises the ten days inmediately prior to the beginning of the event window, and the post event window includes the¯ve days inmediately following the event window.
10 The setup is described graphically in Figure 3 .
After the events have been identi¯ed and the time frame for the experiment determined, it is necessary to de¯ne how to compute the abnormal returns after the event. Following Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997) we start with the simplest model which assumes that the normal return is constant. Call X t the sovereign spread of any country at moment t. We assume that the model which describes this spread is
where ¹ indicates the normal return and ² indicates the "abnormal" return. We assume that The estimated abnormal return follows:
where the hat indicates an estimated value. Our estimator will be then
which de¯nes the average estimated abnormal return in the post-event window (the * indicates belonging to the post-estimation window). Our null hypothesis is
If the null hypothesis holds it will indicate that there is an impact of currency risk on country risk, i.e. we would conclude that there is no evidence that currency risk a®ects country risk.
In order to construct the test we need to estimate the variance covariance matrix of ² ¤ . Notice that b ² ¤ t can be considered a forecast error of the return, and thus its covariance matrix will have two parts. The¯rst is the variance of the disturbances, and the second is the additional variance due to sampling error in the estimation of the normal return. This sampling error, which is common for all the abnormal returns estimated in the post event window, will lead to serial correlation despite the fact that the true disturbances are independent through time. This will imply a non diagonal variance covariance matrix which has to be taken into account when estimating the variance of average estimated abnormal returns. To start we need to estimate the variance of the estimated abnormal return in the post-event window. More precisely:
where ¶ indicates a vector of ones. Having estimated the variance covariance matrix of each individual forecast error we compute the variance of our statistic:
Substituting the estimate for the variance by its unbiased sample estimate we can construct the statistic:
which is the statistic we use to estimate if currency risk has any impact on country risk.
This test however, corresponds to a test of abnormal returns only for the case of one event. In order to gain more degrees of freedom, and assuming independence across events for each country, the tests can easily be aggregated to:
where n indicates the number of events considered for each country. In the speci¯cation below we distinguish between positive and negative shocks which are tested separately. 
The Market Model
In the market model the event window is chosen as the date in which the event occurs together with the three previous dates. The estimation window comprises the twenty days inmediately prior to the beginning of the event window, and the post event window includes the¯ve days inmediately following the event window. 12 The setup is described graphically in Figure 4 .
In the speci¯cation we assume that the sovereign spread is related to an average market return (in our empirical speci¯cation below we will compare, for example, the sovereign spread of a speci¯c Latin American country with the overall spread for Latin American). In short
this can be expressed as a regression system
As in any model we will have that the estimate of the market model obtained from the data in the estimation window will be
where L is the lenght of the estimation window. The estimation error is
As before, the estimated abnormal return in the post-event window will equal
and its variance-covariance matrix equals
where I is M £ M where M is the length of the post-event window. Again our estimate is
and its variance obtained from above
Similar to above the aggregate test can be computed as
where the estimated variance uses the unbiased sample moments.
The European Experience
In order to assess the relationship between country and currency risk we start by looking at the European experience during the 90 ¶s. We believe Europe is an excellent testing ground for the relationship between these two spreads as during the decade the continent was subject to several shocks which were exclusively related to the consolidation or weakening of the process of monetary integration. Changes in the prospects for monetary uni¯cation a®ect directly the currency risk of the countries involved, thus allowing for an almost perfect natural experiment for testing the impact of currency risk on country risk. For example, the result of a referendum on monetary union in one country of the continent is a shock which a®ects directly the degree of currency risk in all other countries of the sample. These types of largely institutional shocks then provide a set of observations of exogenous shocks to currency risk. We can then test whether they have a signi¯cant e®ect on country risk. In order to apply our event study methodology to the European experience we proceed as follows. We¯rst compute the sovereign risk for some selected European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Spain and Sweden. The reason for choosing these countries is that they had outstanding DM denominated debt throughout most of the period, which allows, when comparing their yield with that of German bonds, to obtain an estimate of sovereign spreads. Table A .1, in the appendix, gives the characteristics of the DM bonds used for each country.
The yield of these bonds was compared to a daily estimate provided by DATASTREAM of Germany ¶s yield curve at the same maturity 13 . The matching of maturities, is essential as many of the bonds were approaching maturity towards the end of the sample. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the sovereign spreads for these economies during the period of analysis. Table 3 summarizes the characteristics of these spreads. As can be seen, the spreads are positive, low and with a fairly small standard deviation. Table 4 , shows, the currency events identi¯ed for Europe. Our events are taken from two sources. First, the comprehensive compilation in Zettelmeyer (1996) . Zettelmeyer, discusses institutional shocks, establishing their potential impact on currency risk (whether they were good news or bad news for EMU), and by checking whether they made it to the¯nancial reports written at the time he identi¯es those which were important events from those that were not. Our second source is Ungerer (1997) who also provides a classi¯cation of the most important events in the process towards monetary uni¯cation. In the tables that follow shocks labelled with a Z were taken from Zettelmeyer (1996) , while those labelled with a U were taken from Ungerer (1997) . Those labelled with a * correspond to non-institutional events (mostly devaluations) which we believe had an impact on currency risk. It is somewhat more debatable whether these non-institutional shocks are not correlated with a general deterioration of economic conditions. If they are, then it is possible that country risk is a®ected directly rather than through the channel of currency risk. Although we believe that it is likely that a devaluation carries new information regarding currency risk and hence still represents a valid event for our purposes, we compute our event studies with and without these events. 
(U)(-) 13-12-96 The EC agrees in Dublin on the EMS II and the Pact for Stability and Growth (U)(-)
We divide the events into Good News (-) events and Bad News (+) events. Good News events are associated with a reduction in currency risk, whereas Bad News events are associated to an increase in currency risk. The devaluation of the irish pound, for example, was considered to increase the currency risk for all other countries, whereas the approval of the Maastricht treaty in France was assumed to reduce currency risk. Tables 5 and 6 show the results for Europe, by indicating the t-statistics corresponding to the test for the null hypothesis that there are no abnormal returns after the currency events. Table 5 considers favorable shocks to EMU whereas Table 6 considers negative shocks. In the case of positive shocks wē nd that these decrease country risk for Austria, Belgium and Ireland with t-statistics indicating a signi¯cant e®ect whereas we¯nd signi¯cant results in the opposite direction for Denmark, Sweden and Portugal. Finally, results for Finland and Spain are not signi¯cant at the 10% level 14 .
Our results are therefore quite mixed with some countries appearing to have a positive relationship between currency and country risk and others going in the opposite direction. Our theoretical discussion highlighted the fact that the relationship could go either way so perhaps these results are not very surprising. On closer inspection, in the case of negative institutional shocks there is clearly less evidence of an association between currency and sovereign spreads (in this case we have fewer events to work with). However, in the case of positive institutional shocks we see there is stronger evidence and interestingly the country pattern appears roughly consistent between both positive and negative events.
One interpretation is that positive (negative) news about EMU reduced (increased) country risk in those countries that were sure to enter but actually increased (decreased) country risk in those countries where entry was far from certain. This interpretation appears consistent with our country pattern as in the case of Denmark, Sweden and Portugal we¯nd that good news about EMU increases country risk -Denmark and Sweden did not enter and it was unclear for some time whether Portugal would meet the convergence criteria. In contrast, we¯nd that for Austria, Belgium and Ireland, where EMU entry was more certain, good news about EMU decreased country risk 1 5 . In summary our results on Europe do not provide evidence for a clear one-way relationship between currency and country risk and show that while a signi¯cant relationship might exist this may go either way depending on country characteristics. 
Emerging Economies
The experience of European economies supports our theoretical discussion that the e®ect of currency risk on country risk may go either way depending on individual country characteristics. In the case of emerging economies in Latin cluding institutional shocks in the group. The results are similar under these alternative speci¯cations to those discussed here. 15 We are indebted to John Dri±ll for suggesting this interpretation of our results.
American countries (LACs hereafter), however, the results may be quite di®er-ent. Unfortunately for LAC there is no set of institutional events, comparable to those considered for Europe. Thus, most of the currency shocks will carry the risk of being endogenous to a general deterioration in economic conditions or`contagion'. Our events, rather than being general events which a®ect several countries, will apply largely to the countries where the event occured. In those cases (essentially Argentina) where we also include certain events which take place outside of the country we choose events which we think are primarily currency in nature. We want to emphasize that we were interested not so much in having as many events as possible but rather in having good events, i.e. events that could be clearly be identi¯ed as those in which, on impact, what changed was primarily exchange rate risk. Thus, we have attempted to isolate events related to actual changes in exchange rate policy or (in the case of Argentina) events that led to a perception of a higher probability of exchange rate policy change. While the market usually discounts changes in exchange rate policy, it is undeniable that when the event occurs (a devaluation or a change in exchange rate bands, etc), there is new information about future exchange rate behavior, and as a result an impact on currency risk. What we test is the impact of this new information on country risk. Even if the shock is not purely exogenous, the endogeneity problem should be, to a great extent, muted by the fact that our data is very high frequency and that we test for changes between a short span of just a few days, which implies that our benchmark for comparison includes most of the information relevant until prior to the disclose of the news of the change in exchange rate policy.
16
Tables 7 through 12 indicate the events that have been considered for Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador, Colombia and Chile. As can be seen, most changes correspond to explicit changes of exchange rate policy or statements made by top o±cials or candidates on exchange rate policy. The case of Argentina is an exception. There, due to the existence of the currency board since April 1991, we consider exogenous shocks that we believe primarily a®ected the perception of risk to the currency board system. Table 7 . Events for Argentina 20-12-94: The Mexican peso is devalued (+) 12-1-95: Banks' deposits in the Central Bank are dollarized (-) 23-10-97: Speculative attack against the HK currency board (+) 19-5-99: Domingo Cavallo's FT interview (+) 16 The methodology for the event selection was both from papers and by asking experts in each country. This later method has the drawback that people will remember only relevant events, thus increasing dramatically the signi¯cance of the events analyzed. We are grateful to Tim Kehoe for pointing this out to us. However this should not bias the results in either direction (positive or negative), and therefore while the t-statistics should be taken with care we believe the excersive remains correct and highly relevant.
Source: authors 17 . 17 In this footnote we discuss the events for Argentina; (1) while the devaluation of the Mexican peso heralded a sharp fall in Argentine asset prices, dollar deposits in the banking system initially rose suggesting that this was¯rst and foremost a currency event, (2) dollarizing commercial banks' deposits in the Central Bank was seen as a policy strongly reinforcing the currency board during a di±cult period, (3) the attack against the HK currency board suggested that even currency boards might be subjected to attack. Argentina and Hong Kong shared virtually nothing else in common except the exchange rate system. A commonly held view in the market at the time was that if the HK currency board was changed then there was little chance the Argentine one would survive, (4) Domingo Cavallo (presidential candidate and ex economy minister) appeared to suggest in an interview in the Financial Times that Argentina could abandon the currency board -at least that was the title that the FT used even if the arguments in the article itself were more subtle in nature.
Source: Events and dates were provided by Alberto Carrasquilla and Roberto Steiner. Also from Alesina, Carrasquilla, Steiner (2000) . Again, shocks are identi¯ed as good news (-) and bad news (+) according to whether they decrease or increase currency risk. Tables 13 and 14 present the results for the 5 day post-event window for the constant mean and market model. The tables show a very similar pattern with a strong impact of currency on country risk in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador and Mexico but a di®erent pattern for Colombia and Chile. Our preferred test is that using the market model, as here we control for other aspects a®ecting country risk over the event window, and hence we use Table 14 to guide the discussion. As can be seen the impact of an increase in currency risk is very signi¯cant in the¯rst four countries, and -20 -19 -18 -17 -16 -15 -14 -13 -12 -11 -10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
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Figure 5: Response of Country Risk to good news on Currency for Chile similarly, the reduction in country risk as a result of a reduction in currency risk is equally signi¯cant. The opposite pattern is evident for Chile and Colombia. There, an increase in currency risk seems to have no e®ect (it does decrease country risk signi¯cantly in the constant mean model), whereas reductions in currency risk seem to increase country risk signi¯cantly. We conjecture that these results are roughly consistent with the extent of dollarization. Chile and Colombia are arguably the least dollarized countries in our sample and hence balance sheet e®ects may be less relevant. Argentina and Ecuador are probably the most dollarized countries and here we¯nd very signi¯cant e®ects. Dollarization is also important in Mexico and to a lesser extent in Brazil. Our results then broadly support the view that countries with higher indices of dollarization may also have a greater impact of currency risk on country risk.
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Post-event window Finally, in this section, we address the question of whether the events depicted in Tables 7 through 12 represent true events in which currency risk increased. In order to check this, we replicate our analysis (using the constant mean speci¯cation) in order to verify that in the events considered currency risk moved in the direction suggested. The data corresponds to forward contracts. While our database does not allow to test this hypothesis in the case of all events, the table is persuasive enough in showing that the events considered had a signi¯cant e®ect on currency risk, which in all but two cases moved in the expected direction. As can be seen, except in the¯rst "ampliaci ¶ on del corto" in Mexico and in the announcement of the dollarization in Ecuador, the movement in the forward market indicates a change in the expected exchange rate in the direction assumed in our test. This gives us some comfort that the events that were selected were indeed signi¯cant in altering currency risk.
Country

Conclusions
In this paper we have attempted to investigate the relationship between currency risk and country risk. Casual empiricism reveals that for several emerging countries, measures of these two risks are highly correlated and several authors have hypothesised that the elimination of currency risk through dollarization may then lead to a signi¯cant reduction in country risk. However, a correlation does not imply causality in a particular direction and, as discussed in thē rst section of this paper, there are theoretical arguments that suggest a causal relationship in both directions. Given the nature of the measures of country risk and currency risk available, it is extremely di±cult using conventional time series methods to test for causality ie: to establish exogeneity. The measures available stem from market prices and hence if markets operate e±ciently both series will adjust instantaneously to news. In practice, we hypothesise that local currency asset markets are less liquid for many emerging countries than their foreign currency counterparts and this implies that country risk spreads may react more rapidly than currency risk spreads, biasing the results towards a¯nd-ing that country risk causes currency risk and not vice versa using conventional time series methods.
In this paper, we therefore adopt a di®erent approach. We develop an event study methodology where we choose particular events which we believe are primarily currency events and, within a de¯ned event window, analyse how country risk reacts. We consider¯rst a set of European countries and secondly a set of emerging countries in Latin America. The case of Europe is particularly interesting. Here, a set of institutional events regarding the changing likelihood of successful monetary integration provide a natural set of exogenous currency risk shocks. Our results are mixed in that in some countries we¯nd a positive e®ect of currency risk on country risk and in other countries we¯nd the opposite relationship and in a third group we¯nd no signi¯cant relationship. These results re°ect our theoretical discussion that the relationship could go either way. A fascinating interpretation of our results however divides countries into those where EMU entry was essentially guaranteed and those countries where EMU entry was very uncertain or unlikely. In the¯rst group we found a positive relation between currency risk and country risk (ie: good news for EMU implying reduced currency risk and led to reduced country risk) whereas in the second group the opposite result held.
In the case of emerging countries in Latin America our results are quite di®erent. Unfortunately, we do not have such a natural set of exogenous, institutional events for this analysis as we used for Europe. However we attempted to de¯ne events that represented actual changes in exchange rate policy or (in the case of Argentina), events that changed the perception of the probability of future changes. We also attempted to limit ourselves to events that we felt comfortable as exogenous and primarily currency related. Finally, the short`event window' employed gives comfort against the charge that the currency events employed are endogenous to, say, a general decline in economic conditions. Given these safeguards, our results for Latin American emerging countries are strong and in broad terms support those that argue that the elimination of currency risk will have a signi¯cant impact on country risk spreads. However, there is also variation in our results for our sample of countries. We¯nd that for Colombia and Chile there is less evidence that currency risk a®ects country risk and indeed even¯nd that good news about the currency increases country risk. It is interesting to note that these are the least dollarized countries in our sample. On the other hand we¯nd signi¯cant impacts of country risk on country risk formore highly dollarized Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Ecuador such that good (bad) news on the currency reduces (increases) country risk. Our results then also broadly support the view that the e®ect of currency risk on country risk may depend on the degree of de facto dollarization. 
